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ACCOUNTABILITY, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT
EFFECTIVENESS IN
ASIA: AN EXPLORATION OF WORLD BANK GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS
Gene A. Brewer, Yujin Choi and Richard M. Walker
ABSTRACT
This study utilizes World Bank Governance indicators to investigate government
effectiveness in Asia, both regionally and across sub-regions. Several factors seem to
influence the level of government effectiveness: accountability and voice, control of
corruption, and wealth and income. The presence of a democratic form of government does
not seem to be an important factor, but we note that more sensitive measures of democracy
might produce more positive results. We then comment on the strengths and weaknesses of
the dataset and offer some suggestions for future research.
INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years questions about governance capacities and the performance of
governments has become internationally prevalent, and performance management has
become  a  central  concern  in  the  field  of  public  management  (Boyne  et  al.,  2006;
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereafter OECD], 2005; Pollitt
and Bouckaert, 2004). New Public Management (NPM) reforms within OECD nations have
accelerated this trend, and currently many public institutions in the world are implementing
various reforms to measure and improve their performance. Although growing attention has
been given to the question of improving government effectiveness (Boyne, 2003),
surprisingly little cross-country research has been carried out using an evidence-based
approach (Brewer, 2004; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Van de Walle, 2005). Furthermore, most
research about governance and performance has been largely limited to historical case
studies, which makes systematic testing and comparison between countries difficult.
In fact, from an international and central government standpoint, large-N studies within a
single country (such as U.S. Federal agencies, state health and human service organizations,
English local authorities, or Texas school districts) are little more than intensive case
studies that supply an incomplete picture of government effectiveness in the country being
studied and provide a weak basis for generalizability to other settings or countries. Such
studies merely inform us about one part of the public sector in one country, and are
typically time-bound. Such “snapshots” do not capture the rapidly changing social,
economic, and political environment that frames the public sector, or the dynamism and
innovativeness of many public sector organizations. Our point is not to disparage these
important studies, for indeed, they have provided path-breaking evidence about government
performance and effectiveness, and from a more parochial standpoint, we (Brewer and
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Walker) have been primary contributors to that growing body of literature. Rather, our
main purpose is to highlight the sizable gap that exists in the performance literature on
cross-country studies. Very few have been mounted. Moreover, the studies described above
may contribute to theory development, but they cannot satisfy the need for more descriptive
work on government performance in the Asian region, which is sorely lacking.
To help fill this gap in the literature this article empirically investigates the relationship
between accountability, corruption, and government effectiveness, focusing on Asian
countries. We are interesting in Asia because of recent changes. Notably the Asian
Financial Crisis fundamentally affected many Asian societies during the late 1990s and led
to many countries launching NPM reforms to improve governance in various areas. In
addition, corruption levels are a prominent bureaucratic pathology in many Asian countries
and have been commented upon for some time (Schaffer, 1986). Furthermore, cross-
country studies on governance have mainly focused on OECD and Western countries. This
scarcity of research is partly due to the difficulty of assessing information, such as written
documents in English (Jones & Kettl, 2003) though a comparative literature is emerging
(Wescott & Jones, 2007).
In this article we are interested to know if Asia is different from other regions in the world
on key measures of governance that include accountability, corruption and government
effectiveness. Our analysis also extends to examining governance capacities within Asia in
an attempt to identify some key variables that are likely to influence governance outcomes.
Alongside this geographically focused analysis we also explore the impact of societal
wealth on progress on accountability, corruption and government effectiveness.
The present study is organized as follows. The first part summarizes previous cross-country
literature regarding government effectiveness. We then introduce the dataset and research
method used in this study. The data used are the 2006 update of the World Bank’s
worldwide government indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2006). This dataset is particularly
robust, for it incorporates various data sources constructed by different organizations. The
preliminary nature of this study is singled in our findings section where we explore
descriptive statistics and use three background variables to explore variations in the
accountability, corruption, and government effectiveness indicators. In the conclusion,
some future directions for research are discussed.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we first review government performance research in cross-country settings.
Then we argue that more cross-country studies are needed, particularly in underdeveloped
regions. Finally, we explain the need for more studies of Asian countries.
Performance management is currently in vogue in the worldwide public sector, but cross-
country research on government performance is relatively rare. Moreover, researchers have
employed different indicators for measuring government performance (e.g., effectiveness,
bureaucratic quality, efficiency, corruption, and rule of law) due to the lack of agreement
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regarding the definition of performance. Carvalho et al. (2006) indicate that cross-country
comparisons of government effectiveness are impeded by different data collection methods
and different definitions of variables (also see Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2003; Boyne et
al., 2006).
There is a paucity of cross-country research on government performance overall. However,
several scholars have conducted empirical studies and assessed the impact of various
independent variables on performance across countries. For instance, bureaucratic structure,
cultural and social differences including religion or ethnic diversity, openness,
administrative reform, bureaucratic structure, and political accountability have been used as
determinants of government performance in the previous studies. La Porta et al. (1999)
analyze measures of government performance and their possible determinants in 152
countries. The determinants of government effectiveness are drawn from economic,
political, and cultural theories. La Porta et al. (1999) conclude that quality of government is
closely related to cultural differences such as religion or ethnic diversity. In contrast, Islam
and Montenegro (2002) find that social characteristics, including ethnic diversity, are not
associated with institutional quality. Concerning the size of government, the authors
suggest that bigger governments are more likely to perform better. However, Afonso et al.
(2003) and Brunetti and Weder (1999) present evidence supporting the opposite conclusion.
Several studies have shown that bureaucratic structure is a significant factor which
influences government performance. Rauch and Evans (2000) conclude that meritocratic
recruitment, internal promotion and career stability lead to increased performance. From a
survey in twenty African countries, Court et al. (1999) find that better bureaucratic
performance is associated with more bureaucratic power and autonomy, better career
opportunities in the public sector, higher pay of public employees, and minimal shifting
between public and private employment.
The relationship between openness and government performance is also analyzed in
previous studies. Openness is mainly measured in terms of economic trade between
countries. Brunetti and Weder (1999) find that more open countries have better
governments. Islam and Montenegro’s (2002) study finds the same result. Also, Brewer
(2004) conducts an empirical study of the relationship between administrative reform and
bureaucratic performance in 25 OECD nations. His study shows that contextual factors
(i.e., political risk variables) have a greater effect on bureaucratic performance than the
particular type of administrative reforms that have been implemented.
Adsera et al. (2003) consider level of democracy, including civil liberties and free
circulation of daily newspapers per person, as indicators of political accountability.
They find the positive impact of political accountability on the quality of government using
panel models. Similarly, Brewer and Choi (2007) investigated the relationship between
democracy and government performance with panel data compiled from 213 countries over
the period 1996-2005. Their results showed that democracy was positively and significantly
related to government performance. More democratic countries tended to have more
effective governments and do a better job of controlling corruption.
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To summarize, there are few cross-country studies of government performance, and most of
these studies have focused on developed nations. Few studies have examined regional
differences, and even fewer have focused on sub-regional trends. The studies mounted thus
far have identified some promising variables, but their findings are not wholly consistent.
More studies are needed to fill in these gaps and sort out conflicting findings from prior
research. Cross-country studies of Asian countries are extremely rare in this line of
research. There is an urgent need for scholars to attempt more empirical research on
government performance in the Asian region, in part because China and several other
countries are among the fastest growing economic powers in the world, and also because
the region faces a number of unique challenges.
DATA AND METHODS
In  this  article  we  use  the  World  Bank’s  Governance  Indicators  to  explore  accountability,
performance and corruption in Asian countries. The Indicators provide data on 213
countries and territories for the period 1996-2005 (the data are biannual, 1996-2002 and
annual thereafter). Six dimensions of governance are included in the set of indicators:
? Voice and accountability,
? Political stability and absence of violence,
? Government effectiveness,
? Rule of law,
? Regulatory quality, and
? Control of corruption.
The construction of the indexes is complex, drawing upon data from 25 organizations,
many tens of variables and over thirty datasets. Unobserved components models are used to
create the indexes, and the resultant measures range from -2.5 to 2.5 with a mean of zero.
Our purpose in this article is not to critique these data, but to use them to examine
variations in voice and accountability, government effectiveness and control of corruption.
Further details of the Worldwide Governance Indicators can be found in the papers by
Kaufmann and colleagues at the World Bank (for details, see Kaufmann et al., 2006 or visit
www.worldbank.org).
We focus on three indexes: “voice and accountability,” “control of corruption,” and
“government effectiveness.” These are selected because they are more related to our
interest: public management. Of the others, political stability is more clearly associated
with political science while the rule of law is linked to legal studies. Kaufmann et al. (2006,
p. 4) describe the measures as follows:
(1) Voice and accountability measures “the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and free media.”
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(2) Control of corruption measures “the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of
the state by elites and private interests.”
(3) Government effectiveness measures “the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil services and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies.”
To ascertain if there were variations in these measures of governance, comparisons between
different countries by region, sub-region, democracy and wealth of nations were
undertaken. Countries were categorized into regions based upon United Nations groupings
(www.un.org). This includes: Asia, Africa, North America, South America, the Caribbean
and Central America, Europe, and Oceania. Asian countries are examined in more detail,
and the list of countries used for Asian sub-regions and those classified as a democracy, or
not, are included in the Appendix. We use income level as a measure of the wealth of
nations. To classify the countries used in this study, we used the World Bank List of
Economics (2006) which includes 2005 data for gross national income per capita. Four
groups are identified: low income, $875 or less; lower middle income $876-$3,465; upper
middle income $3,466-$10,725; and high income $10,726 or more.
The analysis is undertaken on a cross-sectional panel of 1,369 cases. Descriptive statistics
are examined and similarities and differences between groups and measures are made using
correlations, t-tests and analysis of variance (ANOVA).
RESULTS
Our initial task is to inspect the relationships between the three World Bank Governance
variables explored in this paper to determine if there are positive relationships between
corruption and effectiveness and accountability and effectiveness. Table 1 provides a
correlation matrix that suggests that there are strong relationships between these variables
with  correlation  coefficients  ranging  from  0.75  to  0.94.  This  suggests  that  the  control  of
corruption is strongly associated with government effectiveness (r=.9425), and that
accountability is also associated with government effectiveness, though with a lower
correlation (r=.7744). These findings imply that government effectiveness is enhanced
when corruption is controlled for and societies have voice and accountability channels.
These findings are not surprising, but indicate that the measures perform as might be
anticipated and give us some confidence to go on to examine these variables in more detail.
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To analyze the collected data, we first consider geographical region (Table 2). North
America and Europe are ranked first and second across all three domains of governance,
respectively. Africa is consistently in the bottom two places based upon these means.
Asia’s mean score on all three measures generally ranks at a low position; last for voice and
accountability, fifth for control of corruption and on the mid-point for governance
effectiveness. Asia is the only region to display such a range of scores, performing
adequately on effectiveness, but more poorly on control of corruption and voice and
accountability.  Notably,  the  score  for  voice  and  accountability  ranks  the  lowest  while  the
government effectiveness score ranks fourth among seven regions of the world.
If we take a mean of the rankings for all three measures it suggests the following: North
America is placed first, Europe second, followed by Caribbean and Central America.
Oceania is in the middle of the rank, placed fourth. Asia is fifth, followed by South
America and Africa. To see if these differences are statistically significant, an ANOVA test
was run and the results are presented in Table 3.  These results reveal that  the differences
among each region and for each of the three governance variables are statistically
significant at the 0.001 level. Thus the achievements and experiences of these global
regions are very different.
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Table 2. Means of the World Bank Governance accountability, effectiveness and
corruption indicators by Region
Variable
Region
Voice and Accountability Government
Effectiveness
Control of Corruption
Asia -.6586994 -.1139589 -.2056637
Africa -.6285246 -.6527322 -.5947009
North America 1.228333 1.704444 1.805556




Europe .821115 .8216606 .806803
Oceania .7620619 -.1151515 .0616049
Table 3. Analysis of Variance of the World Bank Governance accountability,







  Voice and Accountability
Model 606.8 6 101.1 177.5 0.0000
Residual 776.2 1362 .6
Total 1383.0 1368 1.0
  Government Effectiveness
Model 403.5 6 67.3 95.4 0.0000
Residual 948.7 1346 .7
Total 1352.2 1352 1.0
  Control of Corruption
Model 377.4 6 62.9 84.8 0.0000
Residual 962.2 1297 .7
Total 1339.6 1303 1.0
In Table 4 we focus more intently on Asia and undertake a t-test to compare the means of
Asian and non-Asian countries. As shown in Table 4, the mean scores for two groups of
countries are significantly different. For all three measures—voice and accountability,
control of corruption, and government effectiveness—the score for Asian countries are
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lower  than  scores  for  non-Asian  countries.  These  results  suggest  that  the  performance  of
Asia is generally quite poor on these measures of governance and that the region’s
performance is, in broad terms, worse than that of non-Asia societies in general.
Table 4. Comparing Asian with non-Asian countries
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
  Voice and Accountability
Asia 346 -.66 .05 .86
Non-Asia 1023 .19 .03 .96
t -15.37*
  Government Effectiveness
Asia 341 -.11 .05 .89
Non-Asia 1012 .01 .03 1.03
t -2.07*
  Control of Corruption
Asia 339 -.21 .05 .90
Non-Asia 965 .04 .03 1.04
t -4.20*
* p < .05
The difference between the two groups of countries probably involves more than
geographical region because significant cross-country variations within each region also
exist. Thus, income level, another explanatory variable, is employed in the following
analysis.  Table  5  shows  that  countries  with  high  income  have  higher  mean  scores  of
accountability,  government  effectiveness,  and  control  of  corruption.  If  we  again  rank  the
mean scores, as we did with region, the results offer very clear and stark evidence on the
relationship between governance indicators and wealth and country wealth, as measured by
income per capita. Each income band retains the same ranking for each governance variable
thus: high income countries score first, upper middle second, lower middle third and low
income countries are always last. The evidence in Table 6 confirms that there are
significant differences among income groups. The differences are substantial: the lowest F-
score is 303.5, while for corruption the F-score rises to 961.2. This suggests that
wealth/income is a powerful explanatory variable of governance, more so that the regional
aspects examined above (the F-scores in Table 3 range from 84.5-177.5).
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Table 5. Means of the World Bank Governance accountability, effectiveness and
corruption indicators by Income
Variable
Income level
Voice & Accountability Government
Effectiveness
Control of Corruption
Low -.7845924 -.8140164 -.7858592
Lower middle -.3750246 -.4688557 -.5259694
Upper middle .4062257 .1499216 .0992593
High .847931 1.330098 1.408562
Table 6. Analysis of Variance of the World Bank Governance accountability,







  Voice and Accountability
Model 552.2 3 184.1 303.5 0.0000
Residual 816.2 1346 .6
Total 1368.4 1349 1.0
  Government Effectiveness
Model 878.6 3 292.9 846.9 0.0000
Residual 458.5 1326 .3
Total 1337.1 1329 1.0
  Control of Corruption
Model 922.1 3 307.4 961.2 0.0000
Residual 410.9 1285 .3
Total 1333.0 1288 1.0
Given the strength of wealth as an explanation of governance capacity, we returned to the
earlier correlations reported in Table 1 between the governance variables of interest in this
article. A partial correlation is used for statistical control, thus we recomputed the
correlations in Table 1 while controlling for income. When we do this, the correlation
coefficients drop from the original values suggesting that income mediates the
relationships. The partial correlation coefficient between voice and accountability and
government effectiveness is r=.4806, a decrease of nearly .3 from the original correlation
coefficient, r=.7744. When controlling for income, the coefficient between control of
corruption and government effectiveness drops by .1 to r=.8405 compared to the original
correlation, r=.9425. Income clearly influences the relationship between our variables.
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The remaining analysis focuses on Asia. We present a similar analysis to that reported
above, focusing upon region and income, but also include a dichotomous variable that
classifies countries by their democratic status. As shown in Table 7, Eastern Asia (i.e.,
China, Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, Mongolia and the Republic of Korea) has the highest
scores on three measures. By contrast, Central Asia scores lowest on voice and
accountability, government effectiveness and control of corruption. These countries are in
the former Soviet block and are transitional economies. Moving up the ranking, Central
Asia is followed by Southern Asia, South Eastern Asia and Western Asia. The differences
between these mean scores for each region of Asia were compared via an ANOVA test.
The differences of mean scores among sub-regions of Asia are statistically significant at the
.01 levels for each governance indicator (see Table 8). The biggest difference is found on
the control of corruption measure where the F-score is 214.2.
Table 7. Means of the World Bank Governance accountability, effectiveness and








Central Asia -1.324286 -1.057143 -1.09
Eastern Asia -.183913 .386087 .2676087
Southern Asia -.7985714 -.3398361 -.5038983
South-Eastern Asia -.6839474 -.01 -.2757895
Western Asia -.5619841 .0152033 .0553659
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Table 8. Analysis of Variance of the World Bank Governance accountability,







  Voice and Accountability
Model 28.3 4 7.1 10.6 0.0000
Residual 226.9 341 .7
Total 255.2 345 .7
  Government Effectiveness
Model 48.6 4 12.2 18.6 0.0000
Residual 219.4 336 .7
Total 268.0 340 .8
  Control of Corruption
Model 51.7 4 12.9 214.2 0.0000
Residual 220.2 334 .7
Total 271.9 338 .8
Table 9 presents the results of the comparison of means by income. The same pattern of
results is found in Asia as was noted in our global analysis. Higher income is clearly
associated with higher achievement on these measures of governance. One result of note for
the Asia societies included in this analysis are the negative means for all countries on the
voice and accountability measure, all below the mean of zero.  The results of the ANOVA
test on these data again show statistically significant differences between each income
group in Asia, with the biggest differences again found on the treatment of corruption (see
Table 10).
Within Asia, income level continues to play a crucial role in explaining relationships
among all three measures of governance. Yet after controlling for income, the correlation is
still greater than 0 suggesting that there could be a causal link between the two measures.
Specifically, the correlations of government effectiveness with accountability and control
of corruption are, respectively, moderate (0.5286) and strong (0.8034) in comparison with
the original correlation coefficients. All correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.01
levels providing relatively high confidence.
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Table 9. Means of the World Bank Governance accountability, effectiveness and








Low -1.01319 -.7214035 -.7890265
Lower middle -.9026786 -.4737838 -.6538182
Upper middle -.485 .3033333 .165
High -.0331579 .9017391 .9128261
Table 10. Analysis of Variance of the World Bank Governance accountability,







  Voice and Accountability
Model 59.3 3 19.8 34.7 0.0000
Residual 198.6 349 .6
Total 257.9 352 .7
  Government Effectiveness
Model 156.5 3 52.2 154.96 0.0000
Residual 115.5 343 .3
Total 272.0 346 .8
  Control of Corruption
Model 179.8 3 59.9 214.2 0.0000
Residual 95.4 341 .3
Total 275.2 344 .8
Last, we run a t-test to analyze the influence of democracy on our measures of governance.
Asian countries are classified into two groups: countries with a democratic central
government (e.g. Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia) and those with other forms of central
government (e.g. China, North Korea, and Vietnam). According to the results in Table 11,
democracy significantly matters for voice and accountability within the Asian region, but
not for control of corruption or government effectiveness. This suggests that wealth/income
is a stronger predicator of governance capabilities in Asian societies, and a strong predictor
elsewhere in the world.
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Table 11. Comparing Asian Democracies with Non-Democracies
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
  Voice and Accountability
Democratic 88 -.39 .10 .92
Non-democratic 67 -.94 .12 .10
t 3.50*
  Government Effectiveness
Democratic 88 .01 .12 1.15
Non-democratic 67 -10 .12 .95
t 0.68
  Control of Corruption
Democratic 88 -.18 .12 1.10
Non-democratic 67 -.31 .11 .88
t 0.85
* p < .05
This finding is interesting in light of research by Brewer and Choi (2007), who found a
modest positive relationship between democracy and government effectiveness in a study
of 213 countries during the period 1995-2006, while controlling for more macro-economic
measures of wealth; e.g., inflation, trade and gross domestic product. The latter variable
was by far the strongest predictor in the model. Thus, it appears that economic success—
whether at the individual level or on more macro-economic measures—has a strong
positive impact on government effectiveness. Future research should try to sort out the
impact of democracy, which was not consistent in these two studies.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have examined the relationship between three government performance
measures—accountability, corruption, and effectiveness—in a cross-country setting using
the World Bank Governance indicators. The results of the analyses point towards four
findings, of which the main conclusion is that the wealth of nations is the most likely
variable in this study to affect performance on these three measures.
First, we found that both accountability and corruption are significantly correlated with
government effectiveness. Countries with higher scores on the accountability and control of
corruption index have higher government effectiveness. This might be to be expected, and
it  tends to confirm what we know from prior research on government performance. More
open and transparent societies are likely to be more effective at delivering public services:
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no bribes are paid to receive services and government dollars end up in the desired
program. Although strong and statistically significant correlations are not sufficient
evidence of a causal relationship, they do make causal assertions seem more convincing. In
this case, our correlations suggest that an increase in accountability and control of
corruption leads to better government effectiveness.
The second finding is that corruption has a corrosive effect on government effectiveness
across countries. Government effectiveness is more strongly correlated with control of
corruption than with accountability. This finding remains valid within Asian countries.
Third, the wealth of nations affects the performance of nations on our three governance
variables and reduces the correlations between corruption and government effectiveness, as
well as between accountability and government effectiveness. The impact is greater for the
correlation between voice and accountability, reducing the coefficient nearly .3 for all
countries in our study, but has a slightly less dramatic impact in Asia where the correlation
falls by .25. The relationship between corruption and effectiveness is not mediated to the
same extent, but reduces the correlation by nearly .15 in Asia.
Finally, within South and East Asia, countries with democratic government have
statistically significant correlations with voice and accountability at 0.05 levels of statistical
significance. This positive relationship seems reasonable, in part because some sub-
indicators of voice and accountability are considered essential elements of democracy; e.g.,
freedom of association and press, political rights, and civil liberties. On the other hand, the
presence of a democratic government within a country does not correlate statistically with
corruption or government effectiveness. This interesting finding calls for future research.
Although several cross-country studies have considered a “democracy” variable in their
analyses (e.g., Brewer and Choi, 2007; Adsera et al., 2003; Islam and Montenegro, 2002;
Islam et al., 1997), they do not provide systematic evidence regarding the impact of
democracy on government performance (Skelcher, 2006; Treisman, 2000). Despite the
common assumption that democracy is detrimental to corruption, empirical results are not
consistent with the assumption (Sung, 2004; Trang, 1994).
One implication of these findings is that the variables may be interrelated in ways that have
not yet been explored. For example, controlling corruption may increase economic success
in a country, which in turn increases government effectiveness. The mechanisms of change
also need to be explored and documented more fully. For example, researchers need to
explain how per capita income increases government effectiveness. Does it merely increase
perceptions of effectiveness, or does it act in more substantive ways such as by providing
increased funding for government operations or making social problems more tractable?
The World Bank Governance dataset has advantages in that it gives general snapshots on
each measure and covers a very wide range of countries, but there are several critiques of
these  measures  that  need  to  be  taken  into  account  when  interpreting  our  results.  The
correlations among all indexes are very high. This result raises a critical question about the
measurement validity of the dataset: What exactly do these indexes measure? High
correlations amongst different measures of performance and governance would normally
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suggest that they are tapping the same topics and concepts, and, as Van de Walle (2006) has
noted, it is difficult to grasp what the indicators really mean.
The three World Bank Governance indicator variables used in our study were created by
aggregating several hundred individual variables from different sources. While the
aggregation process increases the reliability of indicators, it simultaneously deteriorates
their conceptual precision (Knack and Manning, 2000). For example, Svensson (2005)
demonstrates that the control of corruption indicator used by the World Bank dataset
represents a particularly broad definition of corruption because it aggregates various cross-
country sub-indexes which often focus only on specific aspects of corruption. A more
technical issue relates to Kaufmann et al.’s treatment of the independence of measurement
errors. Kaufmann et al. (2006) assume the measurement errors of sub-indicators made by
different  sources  are  not  correlated  with  each  other.  This  assumption  can  increase  the
reliability of the indicators, but the possibility remains that the measurement errors are
highly correlated because the experts are likely to share perceptions and read the same
reports to assess complex concepts. If the assumption of independent measurement errors is
disregarded, the advantage of precision from aggregating various sources would be less
clear (Svensson, 2005).
More systematic work needs to be undertaken using these indicators to test their robustness
over time and also to explore their true explanatory capacity. Researchers should consider
unpacking the measures to increase measurement validity. Some sub-indicators may be
more useful than others depending on the research questions. Researchers can refine
complex, broad concepts by thinning out less useful sub-indicators for their own studies.
Furthermore,  the  variables  used  in  the  present  study  are  not  all  of  the  factors  that  affect
government  effectiveness.  For  example,  the  extent  of  managerial  reforms  related  to
accountability, corruption, and government effectiveness were not included in this study
(Knill, 1999; Brewer, 2004). Legal origins also might be related to corruption. For example,
La Porta et al. (1999) argue that countries with English legal origins (i.e., former colonies)
have less corruption, while countries with French and Socialist legal origins have higher
levels of corruption.
Building a new database from the World Bank dataset is encouraged. This effort might
have positive effects on the growth of government performance research in a cross-country
setting. In this study, we have run introductory statistical techniques using small research
models  with  3-5  variables.  With  these  simple  correlation  analyses,  it  is  hard  to  recognize
causal paths from independent and dependent variables, thus various explanatory variables
and multivariate regression analyses need to be utilized in a future study. Though this study
is preliminary and suffers a number of limitations, we hope that the results will foster
discussion and research on government effectiveness, globally as well as in Asia where
more work is urgently needed.
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• Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
• Eastern Asia - China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Macao
Special Administrative Region of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Japan, Mongolia, and Republic of Korea
• Southern Asia - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Islamic Republic of,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
• South-Eastern Asia - Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, and Vietnam
• Western Asia - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen
Forms of Government in South and East Asia
? Democracies include: Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, East Timor,
Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore.
? Non-democracies include: China, North Korea, Macao, Hong Kong, Brunei,
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Mongolia.
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